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NEW YEAR'S EVE AND NEW YEAR'S DAY.
The beginning of the year was celebrated by differ-
ent peoples at different seasons. The Israelites began
their year on the first of Tisri, i. e. on or immediately
after the new moon following the autumnal equinox.
The Mohammedans begin the year with the first day
after Mohammed's flight from Mecca to Medina, which
fell upon the night between the 15th and 16th of July,
622. The Egyptians had not a regular commencement
of the year at a certain and definite season. Their
New Year's Day changed from year to year, slowly
moving backward in the Calendar. Their months con-
sisted of thirty days invariably, and at the end five
supplementary days were added. This leaves about
one fourth of a day in every year, so that in every
period of four years the New Year's Day receded by
one day. This difference caused the commencement
of the year to make in the long run a revolution through
all the seasons constituting one whole year in 1461
years. Thus 1461 Egyptian years are equal to 1460
years of our calendar.
The beginning of the year as it is customary now
among us is due to the Romans, and according to tra-
dition it was Numa Pompilius who let the year com-
mence with the winter season soon after the time
when the days began to increase again. The first
month was dedicated to and named after Janus, the old
two-faced god of the door {Janita), of the beginning,
of time, who looked with aged features upon the past
and youthfully upon the future.
The Saxons, like all the Teutonic nations, cele-
brated the winter solstice as the most joyous festival
of the year under the name of Yule, and when Chris-
tianity was introduced changing the symbol of Ygdrasil
into a Christmas-tree, they called the New Year's Day
" Aefter-Yule," celebrating it in the fashion of their
forefathers with the Wassail Bowl in hand. Those
who were too poor to enjoy a feast at home, went about
with a wooden cup, begging for a gift, and sang :
"Wassail! wassail! over the town,
Our toast is white, our ale it is brown ;
Our bowl it is made of the good maplin tree,
We be good fellows all ; I drink to thee."
A pretty children's song runs :
" Here we come a-wassailing,
Among the leaves so green ;
Here we come a-wandering.
So fair to be seen."
Chorus— " Love and joy come to you.
And to your wassail, too
;
And God send you a happy New Year,
A happy New Year.
And God send you a happy New Year.
Our wassail cup is made of rosemary tree.
So is our beer of the best barley."*
The division between the old and the new, between
New Year's Eve and New Year's Day is artificial. In
reality there is not a certain moment in which by a
sudden rupture the old year ceases and the new year
begins, there is not a special break in which the pres-
ent is turned into the past to make room for the future.
There is always New Year's Eve and New Year's Day
at the same time, and this state of things is the eternal
present in which we live and move and have our being.
Every day is at the same time a doomsday and a day
of creation, a day of judgment and a new start in life, a
day of reaping the harvest of the past and a day of
sowing seeds for the future. But on such special oc-
casions as are New Year's Eve and New Year's Day,
we are inclined to pause, in order to enjoy the good
things we have, to be merry and to wish one another
good luck and happiness. Yet at the same time it is well
to reflect upon our life and work, upon our duties in
the past as well as the future, and upon the results of
our labors as they actually are in comparison to what
they might be or ought to be. And the severer we are
with ourselves, the more wholesome our self-examina-
tion will prove to be for our ideals as well as for us
and for those with whom and for whom we work, and
struggle, and aspire.
The last day of the year reminds us of the tran-
siency of all things. All things will pass awaj', pleas-
ures and pains, happiness and misfortune, grief, sor-
row, hope, and enthusiasm, struggle and toil, laurels
and the fruits of toil. All the things of the world are
transient. Yet the last day of the year is not the end of
time, it is New Year's Eve, and New Year's Eve ushers
in the New Year's Day. New Year's Day, however, re-
minds us of the constant and uninterrupted regenera-
tion that is going on in the world. There is change in
this world, but no annihilation. Death is a phase of
life, and life is inexhaustible, eternal, immortal.
= Both rhymes quoted from An m m'tf! and Qu ,11. p. 97. !
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ENTHUSIASM AND INTOXICATION IN THEIR
ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE.
BY E. D. COPE.
The word intoxication as ordinarily used, is ap-
plied to a mental sensation where the inhibitory power
of judgment is absent or is reduced in relative im-
portance. An intoxication may have physical or emo-
tional causes, so that the English term applied to it,
which is derived from ToSiJiOv poison, is not as appro-
priate as the German Rausch, which has no specific
implications.
Since mental exhaustion always follows intoxica-
tion, it is evident that it is associated with a more
rapid expenditure of energy than other forms of men-
tal action, relatively to recuperation. This will be
more apparent if we review the various forms of it.
Of physical intoxication there are several kinds, which
are natural or artificial. A mild form is experienced
by vigorous persons in coming in contact with fresh,
cool, and pure air ; or after eating a properly com-
posed meal when the digestion is vigorous. A more
intense degree of it is experienced in the reproductive
act. Artificial forms are produced by drugs, as mor-
phia, hasheesh, alcohol, etc. Intoxications of which
the causes are mental, are passions in general. Even
the depressing passion of fear might be included in
the broad definition given above.
Intoxications, with the exception of fear, are pleas-
urable. This is due to two causes. First ; expendi-
ture of energy is always pleasurable, so long as it does
not exceed the supply ; second, such expenditure in-
volves no labor of direction, such as is furnished by
the intelligent judgment. The exercise of the intelli-
gence and the judgment does not supply such pleas-
urable mental sensations as intoxication.
Since expenditure beyond the power of the machine
to furnish energy cannot go on without exhaustion and
pain, it is evident that intoxication cannot be contin-
uous, but must be suspended at least long enough to
permit recuperation. And since the action of the judg-
ment is of the highest importance to our safety in every
respect it is evident that its eclipse must be only tem-
porary if permitted at all. In any case then intoxica-
tion must play a subordinate role in human affairs.
An important conclusion is derived from the facts
of intoxication, parallel to that which may be learned
from the observation of physical sensations. Physical
sensations do not repeat themselves in memory ; a
shadow only persists in the record, which is very un-
like the original. Thoughts (defined as ideation) re-
peat themselves much more precisely ; emotions less
clearly than rational processes. It seems that per-
sistence in the record is inversely as the distinctness
of the original state of consciousness. From this it
may be inferred that the less violent mental processes
are the better builders of brain tissue, while the more
violent are the worse.
The same reasoning applies with greater force to
intoxications. Those of physical origin cannot be re-
produced by an effort of memory, but require fresh
stimulus for every occasion. Those of mental origin
are reproduced but feebly. Both leave traces, which
are the physical bases of habits. Such traces are a
condition of tissue which facilitates a rapid expendi-
ture of undirected energy, and might be compared to
the destruction of the cogs in a cog-wheel in some part
of a machine. This destruction will be injurious or
not, as the cogs are or are not replaced. When the
cogs are replaced soon after they are lost, the machine
is not destroyed ; but there is here no progressive
building.
An important reflection arises from these consider-
ations. Pleasures, physical and emotional, are not ac-
tive Agents in our progressive evolution, even from a
physiological standpoint. The rational faculty is the
leader in this process. Mankind however does not
desire to live without pleasure. Our organisation is
capable of experiencing it, and it is an accompaniment
of several of our important physical functions. With-
out it, some of them would not be performed. The
exercise of the rational faculties requires intermission
for recuperation, and at such times pleasure plays a
most useful part. Moreover the ends for which we
exercise our rational faculties include physical and
emotional pleasure.
Such pleasure may be experienced with the rational
faculties more or less active in control. But this is
not intoxication. One of the fundamental problems
of ethics is to define the extent to which it is safe to
permit the observation of the rational powers of con-
trol by intoxication. It is customary to decide the
question by reference to the actual effect of such states
on their subjects and on other persons. This utilitar-
ian standard is a safe one, but requires much critical
definition. From an ideal point of view it might be
urged that any obscuration of the judgment is in-
jurious. But this cannot be admitted, since the phe-
nomenon accompanies the satisfaction of some of our
necessary physical appetites. A rule of universal ap-
plication which is self-evident, is that intoxication
should never be permitted to exceed the power of
prompt recuperation. Another is that it should never
be permitted in such form and degree as to induce
violation of the rights of others. These rules define
excess in this direction, and if observed, would cause
the disuse of a large amount of physical intoxicants.
The intoxications of passion are principally exhibited
in anger, sexual love, and fear. Anger is for the most
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part injurious in its effects, but in exceptional cases it
is useful. The love between the sexes is generally
beneficial, but in some cases it is injurious, causing
total self deception. Fear as an intoxication may be
said to be always injurious ; as fear in the presence of
an active rationality is necessary and beneficial. A
mental source of intoxication is beauty or harmony of
form, color, and sound, and it is only effective with
persons of aesthetic capacities. No injury can result
from such intoxication except when carried to excess,
as above defined.
The management of one's physical (and therefore
mental) organism is like the administration of an es-
tate. Every man is interested in not living in excess
of his income, and in not injuring the productive ca-
pacity of the property. Every man must be to a large
extent the judge of his own resources and needs, but
many men lack both the knowledge and experience
necessary to guide them. To such, the cautions con-
tained in the preceding paragraphs may be useful. '
To those in whom the love of intoxication has passed
beyond the limit of rational control, I would offer the
suggestion that they place themselves in an asylum
where they will be under the control of others, before
it is too late.
THE MONIST.*
A REVIEW OF ITS WORK AND A SKETCH OF ITS PHILOSOPHY.
The Monist is an exponent of philosophical
thought. It is a magazine which counts among
its contributors the most prominent thinkers of all
civilised nations. There are American thinkers such
as Joseph Le Conte, Charles S. Peirce, E. D. Cope,
Moncure D. Conway (the latter a native Englishman,
but a resident citizen of the United States). There
are English savants such as George J. Romanes,
James Sully, B. Bosanquet, and the famous Oxford
Professor, F. Max Miiller. There are Germans such as
Justice Albert Post, the founder of ethnological juris-
prudence, Professors Ernst Mach and Friedrich Jodl.
The former is the author of " Die Geschichte der Me-
chanik," the latter of "Die Geschichte der Ethik,"
both being the best works of their kind up to the pres-
ent day. French and Belgian authors such as Dr. A.
Binet and Professor Delboeuf. The Italians are rep-
resented by the great criminologist Cesare Lombroso
and the Danes by their most prominent thinker Prof.
Harald Hoffding. Each number contains one or two
letters on bibliographical and literary topics from
French, German, or Italian scholars.
The international character of the magazine ap-
pears also in a rich review of English and foreign
* Yearly Subscription Price to The Monist 82.00
single Numbers 0.50
publications. Each number contains a synopsis of the
most important books and periodicals in the philo-
sophical, ethical, psychological, and physiological
fields. Not only American and English magazines,
such as Mind and the American Journal of Psychology
are regularly reviewed, but also Xh& Revue Philosophiqtie
and all the important German magazines, among them
the Zcitschrift fiir Psychologic und Physiologic der Sinnes-
orgatie, Philosophische Monatshcfte, Viertcljahrsschrift
fiir Wissenschaftliche Philosophic. The great Russian
quarterly Problems of Philosophy and Psychology (Vo-
prosui Filosofii i Psichologii) receives full attention,
and occasional reviews of several Italian magazines
such as the Revista Italiana di Filosofia, and Minerva
have also been added in several numbers of The Mo-
nist.
*
'
*
The Monist represents that philosophical concep-
tion which is at present known by the name of "Mo-
nism." Monism, as it is represented in The Monist,
is in a certain sense not a new philosophy, it does not
come to revolutionise the world and overthrow the old
foundations of science. On the contrary, it is the out-
come and result of science in its maturest shape.
The term "Monism " is often used in the sense of
one-substance-theory that either mind alone or matter
alone exists. Such theories are better called Henism.
Monism is not "that doctrine" (as Webster has
it) "which refers all phenomena to a single ultimate
constituent or agent." Of such an "ultimate constit-
uent or agent " we know nothing, and it will be diffi-
cult to state whether there is any sense in the meaning
of the phrase " a single ultimate constituent or agent."
Monism is much simpler and less indefinite. Mo-
nism means that the whole of Reality, i. e. everything
that is, constitutes one inseparable and indivisible en-
tirety. Monism accordingly is a unitary conception of
the world. It always bears in mind that our words are
abstracts representing parts or features of the One' and
All, and not separate existences. Not only are matter
and mind, soul and body abstracts, but also such scien-
tific terms as atoms and molecules, and also religious
terms such as God and world.
Our abstracts, if they are true, represent realities,
i. e. parts, or features, or relations of the world, that
are real, but they never represent things in themselves,
absolute existences, for indeed there are no such things
as absolute entities. The All being one interconnected
whole, everything in it, every feature of it, every rela-
tion among its parts has sense and meaning and real-
ity only if considered with reference to the rest of the
whole and to the whole itself. In this sense we say
that monism is a view of the world as a unity.
The principle of Monism is the unification or sys-
tematisation of knowledge, that is, of a description of
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facts. This means, in other words : There is but one
truth, two or several truths may represent different and
even complementary aspects of the one and sole truth,
but they can never come into contradiction. Wher-
ever a contradiction between two statements appears,
both of which are regarded as true, it is sure that there
must be a mistake somewhere. The ideal of science
remains a methodical and systematic unification of
statements of facts, which shall be exhaustive, concise,
and free from contradictions—in a word the ideal of
science is Monism.
Monism, as represented by The Monist, is a state-
ment of facts, and in so far as it is a statement of facts,
this Monism is to be called Positivism. The hypotheses
of science are often formulated with the help of analo-
gies, and these analogies contain figurative expres-
sions. We speak for instance of electric currents as if
electricity were a fluid. This method of using analogies
which is of great service for the unification of knowl-
edge must not be taken as real science, it is the myth-
ology of science. The mythology of science is no less
indispensable in the realm of investigation than it is in
the province of religion, but we must not forget that
it is a means only to an end, the ideal of scientific in-
quiry and of the monistic philosophy being and re-
maining a simple statement of facts. The progress
of science and philosophy in this direction will be the
same as in religion. Progress, in addition to a forma-
tion of new ideas, means a purification of our old ideas.
The mythological elements must be separated from
the pure statement of facts, the latter being the grain,
'
the former the chaff ; the latter are the truth, the for-
mer our methods of reaching the truth. The chaff is
the husks, and grain cannot grow without the whole-
some protection of the husks. Thus the truth contained
in mythological analysis is their all-important element
which has to be sifted out and preserved. The rest
is to be discarded ; it has served an educational pur-
pose and will have to be relegated to the history of
science.
Religious progress, no less than scientific progress,
is a process of growth as well as a cleansing from
mythology. Religion is a world-conception regulating
man's conduct. Our world-conception grows with
every new information, and in this way scientific ideas
become religious ideas. Religion is the basis of ethics.
As science commenced with the crude notions of prim-
itive animism, so did religion begin with a mythology
full of superstition. And the ideal of religion is the same
as that of science, it is a liberation of the mythological
elements and its aim is to rest upon a concise but
exhaustive statement of facts, to be constantly enlarged
by a more complete and more accurate experience.
The ultimate goal of religious development is the re-
cognition of the truth with the aspiration to live in
conformity to the truth.
The Monist in this way unites two apparently con-
tradictory but really complementary qualities. It is
conservative and yet unflinchingly radical. It advo-
cates progress, reform, and a further evolution in all
spheres of human life, but it recognises the truth, that
progress, reform, and a further evolution are possible
only by a development of the present state of things.
A revolution, a break with that which has historically
grown up, can bring harm only. The evolution of the
future must be the fulfilment of the hopes, aspirations,
and ideals of the present which have grown out of the
seeds sown in the past.
Although the editorial management of The Monist
takes a decided and well defined position with respect
to the most important philosophical questions of the
day, its pages are nevertheless not resticted to the pre-
sentation of any one special view or philosophy. On
the contrary, they are open to contributors of diver
gent opinions and the most hostile world conceptions,
dualistic or otherwise, are not excluded. Criticisms of
the monistic and positive views are solicited and the
more vigorous they are, the more welcome they have
been and will be in the future.
* *
To give a more complete exposition of the charac-
ter of The Monist, we shall review the first volume of
1891 and sketch the work partly done and partly to be
done in the second volume now under publication.
It is impossible to present a full outline of the articles.
Suffice it to characterise them in brief notices
:
VOL. I, NO. I.
The first number opens with an article by George
J. Romanes on Physiological Selection, criticising Mr.
A. R. Wallace's views of the subject and stating his
own opinion. In a private letter to the editor of The
Monist, Professor Romanes writes :
"The article refers to a completely new departure
"in the theory of evolution, striking in the principle
"of homogamy, the root-principle of the whole, and
"in physiological selection, one of the main branches.
"Yet neither principle has so far been perceived ex-
"cept by Mr. Gulick The theory of physiolog--
"ical selection has been better understood in Amer-
"ica than in this country; and I should like the nat-
" uralists there, who have taken such a warm and ap-
"preciative interest in it, to see my reply to Mr. Wal-
" lace published in an American periodical."
Dr. Alfred Binet, the French Psychologist and
Physiologist discusses the question of the immortality
of protozoans as represented by Weismann. Having
presented many interesting details concerning the con-
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ditions under which agamic propagation is replaced
by sexual reproduction, Dr. Binet rejects Weismann's
idea and in agreement with Maupas and Balbiani de-
clares that "when a ciliate Infusorium multiplies by
"agamic division a great number of times, the off-
" spring that appears after from 50 to 100 bipartitions
"has not the same physiological value as its original
"progenitor; and that agamic multiplication ends in
"exhaustion and in natural death." To a certain ex-
tent, however, Binet concedes the truth of Weis-
mann's immortality idea. He adds: "But it must
"be taken into account, on the other hand, that this
" process of senescence is counteracted by that of con-
'
' jugation, which consists in a nuclear renovation ; and
"since the substance, the protoplasm, of the rejuve-
"nated individual escapes death, a new argument
" might be found in these last mentioned facts for the
"theory of the immortality of Infusoria."
Prof. E. D. Cope is a conservative on the prob-
lems of sex relations. He winds up his article on the
subject with the following paragraph :
"The principles above laid down are those out of
"which have grflwn our laws on the subject. Some
"women and men appear to think them unjust to
"women. It is true that in some respects, woman is
"at a disadvantage. This disadvantage is, however,
"of natural origin and cannot be overcome. On the
" other hand, she has a full equivalent in the advan-
"tages which she also derives from the natural order
"of things. The result is that there is no real cause
"of complaint, unless the correction of the faults is a
"part of the process of ethical development which is
"going on in human society. And perhaps the most
" effective agency in this development is the relation
"of the members of the family to each other, where
"affection takes the place of force, since it is the
"source of our deepest pleasures and our severest
"pains."
Ernst M.-^ch is Professor of Physics at the German
University of Prague. Moreover he is an authority of
first rank in mechanics and must be regarded as one of
the keenest and profoundest of philosophical thinkers.
His philosophical theory of knowledge was akin to
that of the late Professor Kirchhoff. He presented
similar views in the construction of a positive concep-
tion of mechanics in particular and of science in gen-
eral. One of his fundamental ideas is the proposition
that the principle of science is economy of thought.
His best known works are : "Die Mechanik in ihrer
Entwickelung," "Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des
Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit," "Die Ge-
stalten der Fliissigkeit und die. Symmetrie," "Die
okonomische Natur der physikalischen Forschung,
"
"Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen."
The present article on the Analysis of Sensations
explains the basic ideas of his world-conception. Pro-
fessor Mach proceeds descriptively. He calls sensa-
tions the elements of the world and sa}'s
:
"Thmg, body, matter, are nothing apart from this
"complex of colors, sounds, and so forth—apart from
"their so-called marks, or characteristics. That Pro-
" tean, illusory philosophical problem of 3, single in-
" dependent thing with ;«<?//)' properties, arises from
" the misunderstanding of the fact, that extensive com-
" prenension and accurate separation, although both
"are temporarily justifiable and profitable for a num-
" ber of purposes, can not and must not be employed
" simultaneously."
This is the ground from which so many sham prob-
lems arise to which even the man of philosophy at
times succumbs. Also the ego, as well as the relations
of bodies to the ego, occasions the rise of analogous
seeming problems. Says Mach :
"The primary fact is not the 1, the ego, but the
"elements (sensations). The elements ^rcwj'//'/?//'^ the
"/. /perceive the sensation green, means, that the
"element green occurs in a given complex of other
"elements (sensations, memories). When /cease
"to perceive the sensation green, when /die, then
"the elements no longer occur in their customary,
"common way of association. That is all. Only an
"ideal mental-economical unity, not a real unity, has
" ceased to exist."
Professor Mach rejects the idea of an absolute ego
and so he rejects also the idea of a thing in itself. He
says :
"I have always felt it as a special good fortune,
" that early in my life, at about the age of 15, I came
"in the library of my father across Kant's ' Prole-
"legomena to any Future Metaphysics.' The book
"made at that time a powerful, ineffaceable impres-
" sion upon me, that I never afterwards experienced
"to the same degree in any of my philosophical read-
"irg. Some two or three years later I suddenly dis-
'
' covered the superfluous role that ' the thing in itself '
"plays."
Dr. P.A.UL Carus, the editor of The Monist dis-
cusses the problem of the Origin of Mind. He begins
his task like Professor Mach descriptively, taking the
facts as data. The simplest facts of mind-activity,
the facts originally and primarily given are feelings of
any descriptions. These feelings however acquire
meaning, they come to represent something, they are
interpreted. Thus given facts develop what may be
called inferences or deduced facts. And mind is the
organised totality of deduced facts as it is developed
in feeling substance. Deduced facts are the elements
of mind, and mind is not their root, but their fruit.
The following topics are discussed on the basis of
this conception of mind ; The nature of subjectivity
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and objectivity.—The origin of feeling from the ele-
ments of subjective existence.—Feeling with the help
of memory acquires meaning.—Neither feeling nor
mind can be considered as incidental phenomena.
—
The projection of objective facts.—Projection, an econ-
omy of labor.—The subject-superstition and agnosti-
cism.—The objective element in subjective states.
All data are states of subject-objectness.
Concerning Idealism and Realism, it is stated, that
"From this standpoint the differences between the
" schools of idealism and realism appear as antiquated.
"The question whether matter is real, whether ob-
"jects exist, and whether there is any reality at all,
"have lost their meaning. That which produces ef-
"fects upon the subject and against which the subject
"does or can react, is called object. The sense-effects
"produced by the object upon the subject, and also
"the reactions of the subject upon the object, are re-
"alities; and every name of a special object signifies
"a certain group of such effects and their respective
"reactions."
In the further elucidation of the subject the fol-
lowing topics are touched upon :
Inferential facts, if true, are real.—Facts and re-
ality.—Truth and mind.—Facts and truth.—The prob-
lem of the origin of mind. ^Telepathy.— Continuity in
the transient.—Mind and Eternity.
Extremely interesting reading, but light in con-
trast with the other articles of The Monist, will be
that of Dr. Max Dessoir's essay " The Magic Mirror"
which is a study of the psychological problem of fas-
cination. Dr. Dessoir quotes old German sources and
abounds in quotations of many recent experiences in
this line.
VOL. I, NO. 2.
Charles S. Peirce is one of the subtlest thinkers
and logicians not only of America, but of the whole
globe. His field of work is rather recondite to the gen-
eral public, for he writes with great ease and masterly
accuracy upon what might be called the higher mathe-
matics or the differential and integral calculus of
logic. "The Architecture of Theories, " the leading
article of the second number is the first publication of
his in which he propounds not mere criticism or the
discussion of abstruse logical subjects, but his own
positive opinion, presenting in great and clear out-
lines the foundations of his philosophy.
It is almost impossible to abbreviate or sketch Mr.
Peirce's views. He undertakes to explain the origin
of natural law and expresses the results of his thoughts
in the following sentences :
"Without going into other important questions of
"philosophical architectonic, we can readily foresee
"what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately be
"constructed from those conceptions. Like some of
"the most ancient and some of the most recent specu-
"lations it would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It
"would suppose that in the beginning,—infinitely re-
" mote,—there was a chaos of unpersonalised feeling,
"which being without connection or regularity would
"properly be without existence. This feeling, sport-
"ing here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have
"started the germ of a generalising tendency. Its
" other sportings would be evanescent, but this would
"have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit
" would be started ; and from this with the other prin-
"ciples of evolution all the regularities of the uni-
" verse would be evolved. At any time, however, an
" element of pure chance survives and will remain un-
" til the world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational,
"and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last
"crystallised in the infinitely distant future."
Mr. Charles Peirce's article is an attempt to con-
struct a unitary world-conception and to apply the
law of evolution to everything, even to the laws of
nature. The editor of The Monist in his article "The
Criterion of Truth " applies the criterion he con-
structs, to Mr. Peirce's theory. Having stated that
"the criterion of truth is the perfect agreement of all
"facts, of all interpretations and explanations of facts
"among themselves," he criticises Mr. Peirce's prop-
ositions saying :
"The world-conception of Mr. Peirce agrees in one
"fundamental maxim with our own, but it disagrees
"with the latter in the main and most important ap-
" plication of this maxim. Mr. Peirce says, ' Law is
''par excellefice the thing that wants a reason.' This
"maxim was the guiding star of our inquiry into the
"fundamental problems of philosophy. The world
"considered as a universe displaying in all its innu-
" merable actions one and the same law is called a
"cosmos ; if considered as a heap of processes with no
"common law pervading them it is called a chaos.
"We found in our inquiry into the forms of existence
"that the laws of form possess intrinsic necessity.
"... The truth 'one plus one makes two' contains
"the universal applicability of causation and of the
"conservation of matter and energy. Taking this
"ground we arrived at the conclusion that the world
"is a cosmos : there is no chaos and there never has
"been a chaos. A chaos, in the sense of an absolute
"non-existence of law, is an impossibility.
"Accordingly, we cannot agree with Mr. Peirce
" that the occurrence of chance ' calls for no particular
"explanation." There is no chance, if chance means
"absence of law. Chance, if the word be admissible,
"is a mere subjective conception produced by lim-
"ited knowledge and signifying a state of things not
"determinable with the means of knowledge at our
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"disposal. Law once recognised is the death of
"chance (in the objective sense of the word); and
"chance, or sport, or chaos, or indeterminacy, or
"whatever one may call the absence or at least the
"imperfect cogency of law, far from 'calling for no
"particular explanation,' must be classed prima facie
"among those theories that are J>er se impossible."
Professor Lombroso analyses with masterly clear-
ness the criminal characters of Zola. It is an article
fascinating as well as weird, that sets one a-thinking
concerning the abysses of human nature. Lombroso
adds two short articles on criminal anthropology and
psychiatry and on morphological anomalies.
A work of classical importance is Prof. Hermann
Schubert's essay on the " Squaring of the Circle," an
historical sketch of the problem from the earliest times
to the present day. The history of this problem has
reached its consummation since Prof. F. Lindemann
of the University of Konigsberg actually and rigorously
demonstrated in June 1882 that the number n is not
algebraical, " thus supplying the first proof that the
"problems of the rectification and the squaring of the
"circle, with the help only of algebraical instruments
"like ruler and compasses, are insolvable. Linde-
"mann's proof appeared successively in the Reports
"of the Berlin Academy (June 1882), in the 'Comptes
"Rendus' of the French Academy (Vol. 115, pp. 72
"to 74), and in the 'Mathematischen Annalen ' (Vol.
" 20, pp. 213 to 225)."
Professor Schubert's article is a concise, and con-
sidering its limited scope of 38 pages, a very complete
exposition of this most interesting problem and its his-
torical development.
An illustrated article by Carus Sterne "Five Souls
with but a Single Thought " is a contribution to the
psychology of the star-fish.
In addition to these essays this number contains an
excellent article in the department of literary corre-
spondence by Friedrich Jodl on the German philos-
ophy of the Nineteenth Century, sketching in great
outlines the philosophical development of Germany
since Kant.
VOL. I, NO. 3.
Prof. Joseph Le Conte of the University of Cali-
fornia shows in a lucid article that there are several
factors of evolution which enter successively into the
growth of organised life upon earth. With each stage
that is reached new conditions are created, and these
conditions produce a new factor which without oblit-
erating the old factors grows more prominent and de-
cisive than they and quickens the march of progress.
There are the following five factors recognised.
First two Lamarckian factors : (i) Pressure of a chang-
ing environment, (2) use and disuse of organs. Then
there are two Darwinian factors : (3) Natural selec-
tion or' the survival of the fittest, and (4) Sexual se-
lection. Recently Gulick and Romanes have added
another factor : (5) Physiological selection, an expo-
sition of which was given by Professor Romanes in
Vol. i, No. I, of The Monist. Professor Le Conte in-
sists upon the efficacy of a sixth factor, which he calls
"human evolution or the voluntary co-operation in
the work of evolution." This last factor, when ana-
lysed and reduced to its simplest terms is naught else
than the consciousness in man of his relation to the
world as a whole and the attempt to realise the divine
ideal in human character.
Professor Le Conte's essay throws much light upon
the dispute which is at present raging between the
two schools, the so-called Lamarckians and the so-
called Darwinians. It combines both views in a higher
unity.
Prof. Cesare Lombroso continues his sketches of
criminal anthropology by adding thereto an article on
"The Physiognomy of the Anarchists." He says of
them that their heroic deaths, with their ideal on their
lips, proves that they were no common criminals.
Although Lombroso is an extremist in his partisanship
for the death penalty, he cannot, he says, approve of
the shooting of the communards of Paris and the hang-
ing of the anarchist martyrs of Chicago. Lombroso
sees in the features of the anarchists indications of
philoneism, a love of innovation which is one of the
characteristics of originality. He adds :
" I deem it highly necessary to suppress born crim-
"inals, when they reach the persuasion that being
" born for evil they can do nothing but evil ; and I be-
"lieve that their death thus saves the lives of many
"honest men. But we have to do with a very differ-
"ent thing here, where the criminal type is, as shown
"above, less frequent than among born criminals.
"There is no political crime against which the
"punishment of death can be directed. An idea is
"never stifled with the death of its abettors: it gains
"with the death of the martyrs if it is good, as is the
"case in revolutions; and it falls at once into vacuity
"if it is sterile, as is the case, perhaps, with the anar-
"chists.
"
A remarkable study is Professor Lombroso's other
article "Innovation and Inertia in the World of Psy-
chology." Love of innovation is called philoneism ;
love of inertia, i. e. an aversion to innovation, is called
misoneism. Professor Lombroso shows that misoneism
is the character of mankind, or more generally ex-
pressed that inertia is the law of the psychical world
no less than of the physical. Professor Lombroso's
position had been misunderstood and misinterpreted.
He now explains it by reference to the French and
other so-called philoneistic people, showing how
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strongly misoneistic they are. And if innovations crowd
one upon the other like an avelanche which once
started can no more be stopped, is this not also a proof
of the law of inertia ? Inertia is the rule, and muta-
tions are produced by special external incidents which
being usually less persistent, less tenacious change
more the appearance than the reality.
Dr. Max Dessoir had alluded in his article "The
Magic Mirror," Vol. i. No. i, to a psychological theory
of his according to which man's soul consists of a
"double ego," a consciousness and a subconscious-
ness. Mr. R. Meade Bache explains through exam-
ples taken from his own experience that the subcon-
sciousness of man which is a psychological fact does
not imply any duality of mind.
Dr. George M. Gould believes in immortality, but
his immortality is of a peculiar kind. His article is a
vigorous attack on the one hand against any conception
of bodily or individual resurrection as usually taught
by the churches, and on the other against a mo-
nistic view of the world. Dr. Gould is an outspoken
dualist, believing that life is not an immanent feature
of the world, but that it came from without. He goes
over all the possibilities of what we may reasonably de-
mand to be preserved of us and says :
" We have at every hour to clutch ourselves by the
"throat and cry, 'Stay! Who art thou?' And lo !
"while we ask our protean self the question, we have
"become another. We seek perpetuity of existence
"for something ever becoming other. We seek per-
"sonal identity after death, but we have no personal
"identity before death: how then can we have it
"afterward?"
This conception of ourselves is not intended as a
denial of immortality ; on the contrary, he believes
that life is immortal. He says :
" Matter without free life is inert, moved only from
"without: the dead body is simply matter without
"life. It is not the blacksmith's arm that is strong :
"without nerve-force it cannot raise an ounce, cannot
"raise itself. Whence the nerve-force? From the
"ganglionic gray cells of the spinal cord and brain.
"And whence these little gray cells? The dear stupid
"physiologist has now reached his limit, and you can
"confidently answer for him that it was Life created
'
'
these things, Life that existed before muscles, nerves,
"and cells, and that slowly fashioned them; Life, an
"order of existence in no imaginable way analogous
"to, or to be confounded with matter or mechanics."
In answer to Dr. Gould's dualistic position, it must
be stated that matter without free life (meaning thereby
the life of plants and animals) is bj- no means inert,
or moved only from without. If the chemist unites
two elements such as hydrogen and oxygen which
possess a strong affinity, who or what is it that moves
these substances from without. The inherent and in-
trinsic qualities of these substances are the momenta
which combine them. The force is within, not with-
out or behind as a vis a tergo. Matter is not inert in
the sense Dr. Gould maintains and the difference be-
tween so-called living things and dead things is not
the presence and absence of spontaneous motion, but
the organisation of the former and the lack of organi-
sation in the latter. (See Carus, "The Soul of Man,"
Chap. Organised and Non-Organised Life, p. 54 et
seqq.)
The third number of The Monist contains also an
important controversy between Professor Mach and
the Editor on "Some Questions of Psycho-Physics."
Professor Mach's views are in many respects closely
allied to those of the editor. Yet there is a difference
which appears to be more than merely verbal. The
controversy originated out of a private correspondence
concerning Professor Mach's article in Vol. i. No. i
of The Monist. Professor Mach distinguishes between
facts, i. e. the given sensations and thoughts or nou-
mena, the former alone are real, the latter are theories
concerning realities, they are mental tools. He says :
" Physicists have accustomed us to regard the mo-
" tions of atoms as 'more real' than the green of the
"trees. In the latter I see a (sensory) fact, in the
" former a Gedankending, a thing of thought. The
"billions of ether-vibrations which the physicist for
" his special purposes OTf«/(j://)' a««i?ji:(?j' to the green,
"are not to be co-ordinated with the green, which is
"given immediately."
Professor Mach objects to the editor's conception
of contrasting motion and feeling and also to his prop-
osition that feeling accompanies motion. And to
meet this criticism openly, the editor published with
Professor Mach's consent two letters of his in the shape
of an article, saying :
"When a man who has done so much valuable
"work for the progress of science as Prof. Ernst Mach
"finds it necessary to change the position he has
"taken,—a position which has appeared to many
"thinkers as a satisfactory solution of the most in-
" tricate problem in the philosophical and psycho-
" physical field,—there must exist in the solution some
"difficulty which has either been overlooked or at
"least too little appreciated. If there is a flaw in it,
" I wish it to be exposed. And convinced that its dis-
" covery must be of general interest, I take pleasure
" in publishing Professor Mach's criticism of the view
"which I have defended in a former article of mine."
Dr. Carus in his reply to Professor Mach justifies
the j-uxtaposition of motion and feeling as two terms
that are the most general of their kind. The term ac-
company is granted to be inadequate and the monistic
or unitary conception of reality insisted upon. The
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abstract conceptions form two parallel systems, but
the real thing can be represented as parallel only in
the sense that it is parallel to itself. The contrast of
sensation and thought, phenomenon and noumenon is
fully conceded, yet it is shown that this contrast does
not imply any dualism. Sensations are according to
Mach the elements of the world ; they are the elements
of psychic life, but they are not elements /«- se. They
admit of further analysis, although it is true that, if
further analysed they cease to be sensations, and the
units of this analysis are as all our concepts not things
in themselves but abstracts representing not full and
concrete facts, but parts or features of real facts.
An important chapter is "The Origin of Feeling"
from what Clifford calls "the elements of feeling."
The impropriety of this term is conceded since there
is no reason to believe that the elements of feeling are
feelings on a smaller scale. The indisputable fact is
that there is no interconvertibility of feeling and mo-
tion. Feeling is not motions transformed, as for in-
stance electricity is transformed mechanical motion.
Feeling is something sui generis. Feeling cannot be
seen, cannot be observed, it is no objective process.
Its nature is subjectivity. Feeling can only be felt.
It originates from the subjectivity of existence and
may be characterised as a state of awareness. The po-
tential subjectivity must be supposed to exist through-
out the domain of objective nature ; and it is from this
potential subjectivity that actual subjectivity, aware-
ness, feeling, and consciousness originate. In this
sense we may speak of the animation of all nature.
Occasion is taken to refute the error so common at
present that physiology and psychology are applied
mechanics only. Mechanical, chemical, physiological,
and psychical processes exhibit radically different con-
ditions. The student of mechanics, the chemist, the
physiologist, the psychologist, each one of them at-
tempts to solve a different problem. They accordingly
deal with different sets of abstraction. For instance,
the abstraction of the so-called purely mechanical ex-
cludes such processes as chemical combinations, it
excludes such phenomena as those of the irritability
of plant and animal substances, it excludes the modes
of psychical life ; how can it explain any one of them ?
All these sciences deal with certain sides of nature
only, they observe certain and well defined features
only without taking notice of the others. "This how-
" ever does not overthrow monism. We believe none
"the less in the unity of all natural laws and trust
"that if the constitution of the cosmos were transpar-
"ent in its minutest details to our inquiring mind, we
"should see the same law operating in all the different
"provinces; we should see in all instances a differ-
"ence of conditions and consequent thereupon a dif-
" ference of results that can be formulated in different
"natural laws, among which there is none contradic-
" tory to any other."
VOL. I, NO. 4.
James Sully, the author of many valuable books
on psychology and kindred subjects opens the fourth
number with an article on the "Psychology of Con-
ception." The following subjects are discussed :
General Nature of Thought.—Thought as Activity.
—Directions of Thought-Activity.—Analysis, Abstrac-
tion.—Synthesis: Conscious Relating.—Comparison.
—Likeness and Difference.—Conditions of Compari-
son.—Connection between Analysis and Comparison.
—
General Ideas and their Formation.—Generic Images.
—Relation of Generic Image to General Idea.—Tran-
sition to Conception Proper.—The Progress of Gen-
eralisation.—Conception of Naming.— Is Generalisa-
tion Possible Without Language?— Psychological
Function of General Names.—Use of Names in Early
Life.—How Names Further Conception.—Formation
of more Abstract Notions.—Conception as Dependent
on Social Environment.
Professor Sully concludes his essay with the fol-
lowing remarks :
" It is evident from this brief sketch of the develop-
'• ment of the general idea that it is a process that is
" largely dependent on the action of the social environ-
" ment The results of ages of thought-processes
" embodied in the language of educated men and wo-
" men are brought to bear on the growing mind, and
" these constitute a main ingredient in the educational
"influence of the community upon the individual."
Mr. MoNCURE D. Conway's article "The Right of
Evolution " should be read together with and com-
pared with Lombroso's article ' ' Innovation and Inertia
in the World of Psychology." Mr. Conway investi-
gates the growth of social institutions and proves that
no revolution ever overcame the institution against
which it was directed. Revolutionary changes invari-
ably retard human progress. There is accordingly but
one way left to progress, that is evolution. Mr. Con-
way says :
"Though many of the modern socialists believe
"themselves 'infidels,' their movement is the after-
"glow of Christianity. Their method is millennial.
"They look for the destruction of the old political
"world in much the same way as the early Christians
"looked for the destruction of the physical world.
"There is to be a grand transformation scene. Some
" Bellamy is to sound a trumpet, a lucifer match is to
"be scratched, and, puff! away go the pomp and
" glories of this world. The high are to be laid low,
"the low raised high, and a new social kingdom to be
"established. All this, though uttered by some athe-
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"ists, is supernaturalism. It is a survival from the
"millennial superstition."
But what of America? Mr. Conway says:
"There appears to me nothing more important
"than that the world should be undeceived about
"America, whose political history is, really, the great
"warning against revolution,—a handwriting on the
" walls of the world, the misunderstanding of which
"is a peri) to mankind."
England has secured something like republican
government under its mask of monarchy. But Amer-
ica is in many respects not so far advanced.
" When the colonies met to frame a constitution
"for their union the majority had no notion of any
"constitution save that of England, and little accurate
"knowledge of that. What they framed was a crude
"imitation of the undeveloped English constitution of
"a hundred years ago. They made two legislatures
"because England seemed to have two; but made
"them equal, not knowing that in England the two
"were not equal. They supposed England was really
"governed by the king; so, having knocked down
" George III. they set up a monarch much more pow-
"erful, who to-day under the name of president pos-
"sesses more power than any throne on earth. They
"formed a Senate, able to defeat the popular House.
"Command of the Army and Navy, there nomi-
" nally lodged in the crown, was really lodged with
"the American monarch, so that he may slip from his
"civil to his military throne, and rule by martial law.
"This powerful monarch is not elected by the people
"of the United States, but of the states separately,
"through electors proportioned to their members of
" Congress. Consequently, as New York has the great-
"est number of electors, the monarch in nine cases
"out of ten, is chosen by one state. Mr. Harrison
" got a trifling majority in New York, and was elected.
"Mr. Cleveland received some 100,000 majority of
"votes in the nation, and was defeated. A popular
"superstition calls that the Great Republic.
"Political and social evolution must not be con-
" fused with natural selection : it is human selection.
"Some years ago a cotton-planter in Georgia ob-
" served that the leaves on one of his plants were un-
'
'
like the usual leaf ; they were divided as if into fingers.
"So far nature had gone. The planter added his in-
"telligence. He concluded that such a divided leaf
"would let in more sunshine on the cotton. Also
" such a leaf would not be comfortable for caterpillars.
"So he searched out one or two of these peculiar
"plants, transplanted them to a field by themselves;
"as they propagated, he plucked up those with the
"old leaf, cultivated those with the new,—and now
" these new cotton plants, finer than the old, free from
"caterpillars, are spread through many regions. That
"is human selection based on natural selection, se-
" curing the fruits of evolution. It is just as appli-
" cable to man as to vegetation. A better man may
" be bred as well as a better kind of cotton.
'
'
Stanley says that when in sore trouble, in the Afri-
"can forest, he made a vow that if God would only
"help him, he would acknowledge his aid among men.
"His troubles began to clear next day. God was in-
" different, it seems, so long as man and beast were
"suffering, but when this great temptation was held
"out to Jehovah—this promise of distinguished pat-
" ronage—he at once interfered. There is nothing new
"about that God. In the Bible, his providence is al-
"ways purchasable by glory. There are thousands of
"such gods in Africa. But Europeans are going there
"as representatives of civilisation, and will say to
"them in the name of German and English Science,
"in the name of Berlin, Oxford, and Cambridge,
—
" ' These be thy Gods, O Africa ! Only agree to call
"their name Jehovah, who helped Jephtha, when he
"vowed a sacrifice which proved to be his daughter,
"and who helped Stanley on condition that the ser-
"vice would be reported in the press.'
"There is as yet no civilised nation; civilisation
"exists in oases, which gradually encroach on the
"deserts. They have largely encroached on some of
"these already, but civilisation can only extend as it
"is real."
A peculiar interest attaches itself to the article of
Michael Schwab, one of the convicted anarchists, the
same of whose physiognomy Professor Lombroso
says {Monisi Vol. i, p. 339) that he "has the physi-
ognomy of a savant, of a student." Schwab makes
some comments on and corrections of Professor Lom-
broso's article " The Physiognomy of the Anarchists,"
and what he says is to the point. Several statements
of fact alter the value of the Professor's observations
;
we are told, for instance, that "Johann Most has
an unsymmetric face, this however is not the fault of
nature, but of an unskilful surgeon." Schwab shows
convincingly that the Professor is entirely mistaken
concerning Fielden. Commenting upon the remark
that "Almost all the sons of men of genius are luna-
tics, idiots, or criminals," Schwab adds humorously:
"I hope the Professor, mindful of this, is not mar-
ried."
Schwab concludes his article with these remarks:
"One thing more. Anarchism is a collective term
"like Liberalism. People understand by it many dif-
"ferent and sometimes contradictory theories. That
"part of it which is not in harmony with human pro-
"gress will fail, shall fail, and must fail, but that part
"of it which is good will live in spite of all. The mis-
"take, however, which has been made in our special
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"case will not again be made in America; and that
"also will be for the general good."
Prof. Harald Hoffding's and the Editor's articles
belong together; they form a discussion on one of the
most important subjects of philosophy, viz. on ethics.
Professor Hoffding is a Utilitarian ; he bases his ethics
upon what he calls " the principle of welfare," mean-
ing thereby a permanent state of pleasurable feelings.
Says Professor Hoffding :
" If we accept the principle of welfare as our test
"or criterion in judging of the value of actions and of
"institutions, these are then good or bad according
"as in their effects (so far as we can trace them) they
"produce a predominance of pleasurable feeling or a
" predominance of painful feeling in a larger or smal-
" ler circle of sentient beings."
The Editor objects not to the principle of welfare,
but its definition as " a permanent state of pleasur-
able feelings." It is true, as Professor Hoffding de-
clares, "a test principle of judgment must be estab-
lished that will furnish guidance," but this test prin-
ciple should not be sought in the subjectivity of feelings
—be they pleasurable or painful—but in the objectivity
of natural facts. The criterion of ethics. Dr. Carus
says, is not a subjective matter of my or your or any
one's pleasurable feelings, it is an objective reality.
To obey it may be painful to me and pleasurable to
another man. The feeling element in it has nothing
to do with ethics, it is of a secondary consideration.
Dr. Carus says :
"The aim of nature is not the happiness of living
"beings, the aim of nature, in the realm of organised
"life, is growth, development, evolution. Pleasures
"and pains are phases in the household of life, they
"are not life's aim. Experience shows that in reach-
" ing a higher stage we acquire an additional sensi-
"bility for both, for new pleasures and new pains.
"The pleasures of human existence in comparison
"with those of animals have been as much intensified
" and increased as the pains. The ratio has on the
"average remained about the same and it has rarely
"risen in favor of pleasures. Rather the reverse takes
"place: the higher man loses the taste of enjoying
"himself without losing the sensitiveness of pain.
"Ethics, as a science and from the standpoint of
"positivism, has to inquire what according to the na-
" ture of things we must do. It has to study facts
"and from facts it has to derive rules (the moral pre-
" scripts) which will assist us in doing at once what
"we shall after all have to do. The criterion of ethics
" is not some standard which we put up ourselves, the
"criterion of ethics is agreement with facts."
The controversj' brings out many important points
on both sides. Professor Hoffding touches such sub-
jects as the relation of pain to pleasure, the conditions
of happiness, the desire for activity and progress even
though its aims have to be bought dearly with troubles
and great anxiety, the possible conflict between civil-
isation and Professor Hoffding's view of welfare and
the position of the ethical societies whose leaders at-
tempt to teach ethics without a basis of ethics, be the
latter religious or philosophical. Professor Hoffding
approves of this maxim. Dr. Carus discusses the fol-
lowing points : The Definition of "Good."—The Au-
thority of the Moral Command.—Ethics and Welfare.
—Feelings and Judgments.—Pleasure and Pain.
—
Pleasurable Feelings as an Ethical Criterion.—The
Superindividual and Society.—Professor Adler's Posi-
tion. The latter is characterised as Kantian agnosti-
cism, in so far as Professor Adler looks upon ethics as
something that lies outside the pale of human knowl-
edge. His ethics are based upon mysticism.
Prof. F. Max Muller criticises in his article "On
Thought and Language" Mr. Spencer as well as Pro-
fessor Romanes. He says
:
"It is the greatest mistake to suppose that lan-
" guage, such as we know it, what we might call his-
"torical language, always begins with the particular
"and then proceeds to the general.
" I do not blame a philosopher who is ignorant of
"the results obtained by the Science of Language, so
"long as he abstains from touching on the subject.
"But constantly to appeal to language, and yet to
"ignore what has been achieved by comparative phi-
" lologists, is unpardonable. No one is a greater sinner
"in that respect than Mr. Herbert Spencer.
"Mr. H. Spencer constantly calls on the facts of
"language, to confirm his views, but his facts are
" hardly ever correct. For instance : after having ex-
" plained that, according to his ideas, greater coher-
" ence among its component motions broadly distin-
" guishes the conduct we call moral from the conduct
"we call immoral, he appeals to t\\& ^QrA dissolute,
" when meaning immoral, as proving this theory. But
" dissolutus in Latin meant originally no more than
"negligent, remiss. Dissolidio meant languor, weak-
"ness, effeminacy, and then only licentiousness and
"immorality. Language, therefore, in no way con-
" firms Mr. H. Spencer's speculations, still less does
"experience, for no man is so coherent in his acts, so
"calculating, so self-restrained, as the confirmed crim-
"inal ; no one is often so careless, so little shrewd, so
"easily duped as the throughly moral and therefore
"trustful and confiding man."
Prof. F. Max Midler's disagreement with Professor
Romanes turns on the question of the continuity of
evolution. He says :
"My learned friend. Professor Romanes, labors to
"show that there is an unbroken mental evolution
"from the lowest animal to the highest man. But he
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" sees very clearly and confesses very honestly that
" the chief difficulty in this evolution is language and
"all that language implies. He tries very hard to re-
" move that barrier between beast and man. ... I am
"not going to argue with Professor Romanes, as he
"says himself (p. 276), if I were right, his whole
" theory would collapse. I hope this i^s not the case,
"but I feel sure that, if it were. Professor Romanes
"would only rejoice at it. Anyhow why introduce so
"much of the meum and tuum into these discussions?
"If, like Professor Romanes, we begin with the
"'immense presumption that there has been no in-
" terruption in the developmental process in the course
"of psychological history,' the protest of language
" counts for nothing ; the very fact that no animal has
" ever formed a language, is put aside simply as an
" unfortunate accident. But to students to whom facts
"are facts, immense presumptions count for nothing:
"on the contrary they are looked upon as the most
"dangerous merchandise and most likely to lead to
"shipwreck and ruin."
These criticisms form the background upon which
Prof. F. Max Midler develops his own theory of lan-
guage which was suggested to him by his late friend
Prof. Ludwig Noir6. The old theories, which are
characterised as the Bow-wow and the Pooh-pooh
theories are replaced by what Noir6 called the syner-
gastic theory, meaning thereby that language origin-
ated through the sounds uttered by people engaged at
one and the same common work. To forestall nick-
names Professor Muller proposes to call his theory the
Yo-he-ho theory after the sailors' song when engaged
in hoisting or hauling.
The book reviews in the first volume form an im-
portant part of the work. No less than forty-six books
are reviewed, most of them with great care. We call
special attention to the comments made on Prof. Paul
du Bois- Raymond's ideas of gravitation (p. 608); on
the scheme of "General" Booth (p. 451); on Dill-
mann's proposition to make mathematics the basis of
education (p. 617) ; on W. T. Harris's philosophy (p.
438); on Hoffding's ethics (p. 139) ; on Ernst Krause's
studies in comparative mythology, etc.
VOL. II,- NO. I.
The second volume of Tlie Monist continues in the
line of the first. Questions raised in the last number
of the first volume, find their counterparts in the first
number of the second volume, and it is not likely that
those who have pursued with interest the elucidations
of the past year will tire of them in the year following.
Especially Prof. F. Max Miiller's objections to the
continuity of evolution find a counterstatement in two
articles on the same subject, one by Prof. George John
Romanes, the other by the Editor.
The leading article is a lucid exposition by Prof •
John Dewey of the University of Ann Arbor of "The
Present Position of Logical Theory." The article is
of importance as it explains the factors which make a
reform necessary in the field of logic. According to
Professor Dewey "formal logic is at present t\\& fans
et origo malorum in philosophy." He says :
"Nothing is more surprising than the fact that
' while it is fashionable to reject, with great scorn, all
' the results and special methods of scholasticism, its
' foundation-stone should still be accepted as the cor-
' ner-stone of the edifice of modern doctrine.
"According to the old theory, it is assumed that
'thought has a nature of its own independendent of
' facts or subject-matter ; that this thought, per se,
' has certain forms, and that these forms are not forms
' which the facts themselves take, varying with the
' facts, but are rigid frames, into which the facts are
' to be set.
"The especial problem of logic, as the theory of
' scientific method, is the relation of fact and thought
' to each other, of reality and thought, .... Yet it is
'presupposed here that there is some sort of fruitful
' and intrinsic connection of fact and thought ; that
' thinking, in short, is nothing but the fact in its pro-
' cess of translation from brute impression to lucent
' meaning.
"The two main forces, which have been at work
' against the formulae of formal logic, are ' inductive
'
' or empirical logic on one side, and the so-called
' 'transcendental' logic, on the other. The inductive
' logic does not furnish us with the needed theory of
' the relation of thought and fact.
" 'Transcendental' logic, while usually conceived
'as utterly opposed in spirit and in results to induc-
' five logic, has yet been one with it in endeavoring
'to abolish formal logic as the sufficient method and
' criterion of scientific truth. The very meaning of
' ' transcendentalism
' is not only that it is impossible
' to get valid truth from the evolution of thought in
' the scholastic sense, but that there is no such thought
'at all."
Professor Dewey in the course of his exposition
discusses the theories of Kant, Hegel, and Mill, and it
is noteworthy that he throws a new light upon Hegel.
Without being blind to the faults of Hegel's system
Professor Dewey recognises in him the man who en-
deavors to establish the objectivity of thought. Dewey
says
:
"When Hegel calls thought objective he means
"just what he says : that there is no special, apart fac-
" ulty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind
"existing separate from the outer world. What He-
" gel means by objective thought is the meaning, the
"significance of the fact itself ; and by methods of
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"thought he understands simply the processes in
"which this meaning of fact is evolved."
The same topic is briefly discussed by the editoi
on page 119, who says :
"There is no such a thing as transcendental
"thought, or pure thought, thought by itself, and
"there is no such a thing either as fact, crude irra-
"tional chaotic fact. The world of fact, indeed, is a
"cosmos and no chaos ; there never was a chaos and
"never will be a chaos, for the laws of form are an
"essential and the most characteristic feature of the
"world.
"Our pure, i. e. merely formal, thought is an ab-
"straction which serves the purpose of comprehen-
"sion. And so is the concept 'matter,' being that
"which produces sense-impressions. There are no
"such ghosts as pure matter or pure thoughts in re-
" ality. Modern logic, so far as we conceive it to be
"right, is by no means an overthrow of the old formal
''Logic, generally called Aristotelian. It is simply an
"amendment made in order to exclude an erroneous
"interpretation. And so is modern mathematics not
"so much a revolution as an extension of the old Eu-
" clidian system. It is a revolution only against a cer-
" tain unclear conception of mathematics.
The problem of "Modern Logic" is treated in its
connection with the problem of "The Origin of
Thought Forms." The diverse topics discussed" un-
der this caption are : Thought Forms and the Forms
of Existence; The Problem of Apriority; Conservation
of Matter and Energy, and Causation ; Why is Mr.
Mill's Proposition Untenable? The Meaning of Ne-
cessary.
Mr. B. BosANQUET discusses the topics of Will and
Reason. The inner monitor of Socrates was negative,
and there is a sentence of Aristotle "Intelligence as
such moves nothing. The admonition "be reason-
able" generally means give up something you want
very much. The problem is :
"How can we get across from perception or calcu-
lation to anything that can interfere with desire?
"Of course there is a meeting-point in the idea
"that attends desire. Human desire, at. least, is not
"blind. It is desire of something, which is before the
"mind as an idea; here we have one way in which
" reasonings about fact do help to modify our actions.
" If we know distinctly what we desire, then it is rea-
" soning about matters of fact that will tell us what we
" must do to get it. The foreseen consequences come
"in with ali the other circumstances in determining
"whether you like the action or not, and is the con-
" nection between action and reason."
Concerning Hedonism Mr. Bosanquet incidentally
remarks : "There is one great doctrine of reasonable-
" ness which does reduce it to a question of means
"and ends, and that is, the doctrine that everything
"else is a means to pleasure, whether that of the agent
"or that of all sentient beings. The ultimate theory
"would then be that this uniform purpose, pleasure,
"is a natural or obvious, or, so to speak, a. given pur-
"pose, and that all definite action is or has been pre-
" scribed by the intelligence dealing with matter of
"fact, as a means to the realisation of this given pur-
"pose. Here, though I wish to avoid hackneyed
" criticism I must note that there is a certain difficulty
"in getting across from the idea of one's own pleas-
" ure to that of other people's pleasure as a natural
"purpose. Yet we say that the whole complex of our
"moral life is a means to a partial though necessary
" incident in it, it seems to me that we are putting the
"cart before the horse."
In the course of the article Mr. Bosanquet explains
what he understands by the maxims of reasonableness
and insists that what is reasonable must be so in vir-
tue of a positive content. Moral reasonableness must
be a characteristic which we ascribe to purposes of
action. The idea of a reasonable purpose (i) is irrec-
oncilable with abstract Hedonism, (2) it is not the
most intellectual purpose, and (3) it is such a purpose
as possesses a self- consistent relation of the parts to
the whole.
Mr. Bosanquet concludes :
"If I have read at all correctly the lesson of the
" new psychology which owes its origin largely to Her-
" bart, it is an instructive meeting of extremes, that
"the most analytic of psychologies should more than
"ever represent the individual as the incarnation of a
"progressive order in ideas."
Justice Albert Hermann Post, the founder of eth-
nological jurisprudence, lays down in bold outlines the
origin and the methods of this science. Jurisprudence
was no science up to the time of the foundation of the
historical school by Gustav Hugo and Carl von Sa-
vigny. It was an art, the practice of traditions. The
only part of jurisprudence of a scientific tendency was
the philosophy of law ; and to a great extent the his-
tory of law and the philosophy of law still pursue their
solitary ways as independent branches of knowledge.
" In recent times, through the influence of ethnol-
" ogy, jurisprudence has entered on a new epoch. . . .
" Ethnological jurisprudence places the centre of grav-
" ity of the science of law not like the previous juristic
" philosophy in the individual jural consciousness, but
"in the law viewed as a province of ethnic existence.
" It regards the laws of the nations as the precipitates
"of that which is now active and has been active as
"jural instinct in the entire human race. ... It does
"not regard the individual jural consciousness as
" something innate in man and exempt from the alter-
"ing effects of time, but as a product of the social
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"conditions in which the individual has grown up. It
"assumes, therefore, that the individual jural con-
"sciousness changes with a change of the social con-
"ditions, so that a man who grows up under different
"social conditions possesses a different jural percep-
" tion."
Thomas B. Preston in sketching some of the most
prominent features of American politics seems to make
out a pretty bad indictment of corruption. Neverthe-
less he sees that all this petty thievishness and striving
for place are on the surface only, and below the surface
there are powerful undertows working in quite a dif-
ferent direction giving promise always of better times
to come.
"When Washington organised his administration
"it was no doubt regarded in Europe as highly revo-
"lutionary and anarchistic. But such a class govern-
" ment, with laws of entail and slavery, and cruel
'
' punishments for petty offences, as existed then, would
"not be tolerated for a single year at the present
" time."
Since then almost every administration or change
of party government has brought some progress which
later administrations could no more undo even though
they might have had a mind to.
"And so it will go on, first one principle acting and
"fulfilling its mission, then the other, each bringing
"the nation to a higher plane of progress and uniting
"it more and more closely with the grand upward
" march of the human race.
"What is this, after all? It is not socialism. It
"is not anarchy. It is neither democracy nor repub-
"licanism. It is evolution.
"Can the course of such progress be turned back?
"Can we despair of the future in the light of all the
"past? Is not the general movement onward and up-
" ward ? Will not the sneers at ephemeral phases of
" our American politics pass away with the incidents
"which they justly condemn, while the principles of
"progress remain forever?"
Hiram M. Stanley means by artificial selection
" all conscious and purposive arrangements between
"men and women which have in view character of off-
" spring. This is opposed to natural selection which
" is merely instinctive unteleological union with one
"of the opposite sex as impelled by animal passion or
" romantic love."
He takes the view that "the true refinement which
"refuses to obtrude the things of sense, and true
"purity which refuses to dwell on them salaciously,
"are perfectly compatible with the fullest knowledge
"and the consequent action. Lubricity breeds best
" upon a half knowledge acquired in dubious ways.
"The plan of artificial selection which seems to
" me most feasible at the present time would be volun-
" tary associations of men and wo.men who bind them-
" selves to learn and apply the laws of heredity in their
"marriage relations, to seek for expert guidance, and
"in all their life to live not merely purely, but ac-
" cording to reason and science."
Prof. George John Romanes in reply to Prof. F.
Max Miiller's criticism takes up one point after the
other justifying his propositions. A r6sum^ of any
single point would here lead us too much into the de-
tails. Suffice it to mention one topic only
:
" Prof. Max Miiller makes some disparaging re-
" marks upon 'babies,' 'parrots,' and the lower ani-
"mals generally i^The Monist, pp. 586-7), and, says
"Professor Romanes, he 'refuses to argue' with me,
" 'or any other philosopher, either in the nursery or
" the menagerie.' So be it. As a philologist, of course,
"he is assuredly right ; no one would expect him so
"to argue. But as a philosopher, who has written a
"large book on the 'Science of Thought,' he is no
"less assuredly wrong. And one maybe pardoned
"for wondering at this intentionally ostrich-like atti-
" tude on the part of a philosopher—who is 'going
"beyond the origin of roots '—with respect to the fun-
"damental germs of the sign-making faculty."
In the last paragraph Professor Romanes says :
."Thus I invite Prof. Max Miiller to state the
"grounds of his assertion in The Monist, that 'all the
" facts of real language are against ' me as an advocate
"of what he calls the biological theory of the develop-
" mental origin of man. This theory, he says, ' derives
"no support whatever from the Science of Language.'
"I believe, on the other hand, that these are wholly
"unwarranted statements; and that the Science of
" Language does support the theory in question to as
"high a degree as is possible from the nature of the
" case."
Professor Romanes discusses chiefly the details of
the problem of the continuity of evolution. He re-
futes the idea that language can be considered as a
break. The editor presents the same subject from the
philosophical standpoint. Noting that Prof. F. Max
Miiller calls himself an evolutionist, he says :
"The Greek myth tells us that the Goddess of
"Reason, the blue-eyed Pallas Athene, was not born
"like other gods and mortals in the natural way of a
"slow development. She jumped out of the head of
"Zeus full-armed in all her beauty and gifted with
"the powers of her unusual accomplishments. Is
"this myth true after all? Does the Logos of rational
" thought present us with an instance in which the de-
"velopment process has been interrupted? If so, we
"shall have to abandon the evolution theory as a
"theory and return to the old-fashioned view of spe-
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"cial-creation acts. The difference between these two
"views is not of degree, but of kind. He who ac-
" cepts the principle of evolution as the law of life
"abandons forever the idea of special and unconnected
"beginnings as much as that of special-creation acts.
" He cannot with consistency believe in an evolution
" with interruptions, for the theory of evolution is ser-
" viceable only if evolution is conceived as continuous.
" Prof. Max Miiller of course has a right to define and
"use the word evolutionist as he sees fit, but if he
" excludes continuity from the idea of evolution, we
"declare that he has taken out the quintessence of its
" meaning and the core of its truth."
The theory of evolution has been proved by em-
pirical facts ; it rests nevertheless upon another and a
stronger basis than isolated observations. If we call
the doctrine of a continuous evolution an hypothesis or
an assumption, we must also call the law of causation
and the conservation of matter and energy assump-
tions. Then, all formal truths are mere hypotheses.
"Twice two is four" might hold good to-day, but not
to-morrow. It might not, as says Mill hold good in
other worlds. The doctrine of evolution and the con-
tinuity of evolution is nothing out a corollary to the
law of causation and the conservation of matter and
energy, it means that new creations are transforma-
tions.
If we have to give up the idea of special-creation
acts, the question arises "Is not the religious idea of
God destroyed and the whole system of religion over-
turned ? " The answer is :
"We think not. An old and very powerful system
"of theology which has been considered as orthodox
" for centuries will become untenable as soon as the
"idea of evolution and the continuity of evolution are
"recognised in their sweeping importance; but re-
" ligion itself will enter into a new phase of evolution
" and the idea of God will not be cast aside as a mere
" superstition of the Dark Ages, it will be purified and
" appear in a greater and sublimer, in a nobler, higher,
'
' and in a truer conception than ever before. " We must
cease to seek for God in the breaks of the world-order,
and we shall find him in the world-order. "Any kind
"of theology which still recognises special-creation
"acts, or miracles, or breaks in evolution, we do not
"hesitate to say, is not yet free from paganism, for it
"still sticks to the religious conception of the medi-
" cine-man that God is a great magician. The God
"of the medicine-man lives in the realm of the un-
" known and he appears in man's imagination where
"the light of science fails. The God of science how-
"ever is the God of truth, and evidence of his exist-
"ence is not found in the darkness of ignorance but
" in the light of knowledge."
VOL. II, NO. 2.
The second number of the second volume opens
with an excellent essay on " The Development of Con-
sciousness" by Prof. Lloyd Morgan, who does not in-
tend to be put off with the assertion that consciousness
and intelligence are "potentially " present in the germ.
Consciousness is not found in the changes of energy,
nor is it anything material, yet it is closely associated
as a concomitant with the orderly transformations of
energy in the brain. The most satisfactory explana-
tion appears to Professor Morgan to be the hypothesis
of " scientific monism " which regards energy and con-
sciousness as different aspects of the same phenomena.
The tsrm "metakinesis " as the concomitant of kinesis
is a happy expression proposed by Professor Morgan
as the most general term of consciousness, feeling,
and that which is often called, potential consciousness.
The second article will be a surprise to many. Our
commissioner of education is generally credited with
living in the realms of pure thought and Hegelian
speculations only ; here his truly American nature
comes to the front. Dr. W. T. Harris, the head of the
Concord School and the well-known Nestor of American
philosophy shows that the new civilisation depends on
mechanical invention.
" Rehgion and Progress, interpreted by the Life and
Last Work of Wathen Mark Wilks Call " by Moncure
D. Conway is not only a sketch of the Rev. Mr. Call's
life, but it contains also valuable reflections on the du-
ties of liberal clergymen to stay in the church and help
it advance in scientific spirit and broaden in goodwill
toward mankind and the secular interests of mankind,
so that the church may fulfil its sacred mission here
on earth.
Professor Mach gives a further explanation of his
views in connection with his controversy with the
Editor of The Monist showing that our mental sym-
bols are artifices to represent facts, or scaffolds erected
for their reconstruction in the mind.
Mr. F. C. Convbeare of Oxford criticises W. K.
Clifford's views from the standpoint of the late tran-
scendentalist Prof. T. H. Green. This article main-
tains that the mind does not consist of single feelings,
thoughts, etc., but that the mind has feelings, thoughts,
etc. The faculty that brings feelings in relation is
said to be the self of the human soul or its ego. This
view is combated in the following article, "Are there
Things in Themselves ? " written by the Editor, who
maintains that by considering things as if they were
things in themselves, we are surprised to find them
related to one another and thus a relation-producing
entity is to be assumed which leads to mysticism.
This assumed relation-producing entity in the human
soul is supposed to be the transcendental self of man..
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Yet we must bear in mind that things as well as rela-
tions are abstracts only which describe certain features
of reality. The soul of man possesses in its parts as
well as in its unity which is the product of the relations
of its parts, an immanent reality and there is no need
of assuming something transcendental behind it which
would then have to be supposed as being the inmost
self of man so that this transcendental assumption
would be something more real than the actual reality.
This question of " the thing in itself of the soul " how-
ever is a mere side issue of the article which discusses
the following topics: i) Kant's thing in itself? 2)
Kant's view of space and time. 3) Form not imported
by the mind into reality. 4) Professor Jodl's view of
the thing in itself. 5) Clifford's and Schopenhauer's
conceptions of the thing in itself. 6) Things and re-
lations. 7) Is the ego a thing in itself ? 8) The ego-
centric view abandoned, g) Personality and evolution.
10) Professor Mach's position. 11) Truth in mythol-
ogy. 12) The oneness of subjectivity and objectivity.
The Editor of The Monist does not deny the existence
of objective things, but he rejects the idea of things in
themselves as independent of time and space, in the
sense of Kantian or any other transcendentalism. This
question touches almost every subject of philosophical
inquiry and it is the most important problem by which
the minds of the old and the .new world-conception
are most readily discriminated. Clearness on this sub-
ject is indispensable to every thinker, be he a scien-
tist, a man ofjpractical life, or a philosopher.
CURRENT TOPICS.
In his message to congress the President throws a selected lot
of burning indignation over that useful political device known as
the "gerrymander" ; the best abused, and the most highly prized
institution in this land. Pointing to it with his ominous forefinger,
he says, " If I were called upon to declare wherein our chief na-
tional danger lies I should say without hesitation, in the overthrow
of majority control by the suppression or perversion of the popular
suffrage." According to the political sooth-sayers, the chief causes
of the coming rush of the American republic are more numerous
than the post mortem reasons given for the decline and fall of the
Roman empire. I once collected in a note-book the reasons for
the downfall of the Roman empire as I heard them given in the
warning speeches of statesmen, preachers, and reformers. When
I had placed on record the forty-second reason I quit counting, as
I have quit counting the "chief national dangers" of the American
republic. This nation is perfectly safe so long as the people get
something to eat; and it really seems to thrive on the "gerry-
mander." It must be said in-praise of the gerrymander that it is
absolutely fair. In a republican legislature it will cheat the dem-
ocrats, and in a democratic legislature it will cheat the republicans ;
in both cases with strict impartiality. Both parties denounce it
until they need it, and then they both hail it as the redeemer of
the state. In the course of my political career I have seen more
than thirty states " redeemed " from democratic fraud and corrup-
tion, and from republican corruption and fraud, by means of the
gerrymander ; and in some cases I have seen the same state re-
deemed back and forth more than half a dozen times from the
"scandalous misrule" of the opposite party. When I hear an
American statesman denounce the gerrymander I immediately
suspect that in the particular instance under condemnation his own
party has got the worst of it ; and thus it appears to be now ; the
democratic legislature of Michigan has gerrymandered the state so
as to cheat the republicans out of a few votes in the electoral col-
lege next year ; and that's why it appears in the message as our
"chief national danger." The gerrymander is a contemptible style
of larceny, but it will flourish until our presidents and our legis-
lators oppose it on principle when it works for the benefit of their
own party ; and not merely for expediency when it works the
other way.
* *
Will the philosophers explain to me on scientific principles
why the wish to be a Santa Claus acts with irresistible fascination
on some people at the Christmas time of the year ? For instance,
a stranger enters the office of Judge Tuley, and remarks to the
Judge like this, "I understand that Mrs. Tuley is engaged in
charitable work ? " " Yes !" says the Judge. "Will you be kind
enough to hand her this ? " says the stranger, passing over five
hundred dollars. " Who from ? " says the judge. "No name,"
says the stranger, and goes out. Calling him George Nemo, for
want of his real name, I would like to reckon him up, and get the
exact quotient or sum total of him if I can. Was he one of those
lazy benefactors who give because the angel within them drives,
but who take no pleasure in the giving ? If so, what ecstacy he
misses in giving up the work to another ! People of the lower
strata who have enjoyed the luxury of giving ten cents or a quarter
to some worthy or unworthy sufferer, it makes no difference which,
can estimate the heaps of joy which Mr. Nemo might have had in
giving away with his own hand that five hundred dollars To be
sure, he thought that Mrs. Tuley could give it away better than he
could, and in this he was doubtless right, but he loses the fun, and
in my opinion, much of the blessing too. Perhaps he had no right
to the luxury of distributing the money, having merely fined him-
self five hundred dollars for some wrong thing done. Without
speculating on the stimulant that actuated Mr. Nemo, what I wish
to ask is this, Can a man be charitable by an agent, any more than
he can be religious by deputy ? M. M. Trumbull.
jES* Vol. V. of The Open Court closes with this number. The
first number of Vol. VI. will be a double number.
MR. C. S. PEIRCE has resumed his lessons by correspondence in the
Art of Reasoning, taught in progressive exercises. A special course in logic
has been prepared for correspondents interested in philosophy. Terms. S30.
for twenty-four lessons. Address; Mr. C. S. Peirce, "Avisbe," Mitford, Pa.
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